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Abstract 
The current study exarnined the effects of self-awareness on the \vay individuals 
retrieve n1crnories. Scl f-awareness is defined as attention f ocuscd to\vard the self. 
Specifically, we evaluated the differences between depressed and nondcpressed 
people in their reactions to self-awareness. Based on previous research \VC 
hypothesized that depressed subjects \VOtdd retrieve rnore negative n1cn1orics than 
nondcprcssed subjects (Clatk & Teasdale, 1982; Finkel, Glass & ~1crluzzi, 1982). 
Additionally, we expected self-awareness to cause this ncgati ve rncrnory bias to be 
exacerhatcd (Pyszczynski & G rcenberg, 1989). Results, in general, supported our 
hypotheses. I-Io\vevcr, our distraction task acted in an unexpected \vay. We 
expected distraction to counteract the effects of attentional focus on n1en1ory 
retrieval. Instead, distraction actually caused subjects to rate their n1ernories. as 
n1ore negative and less clear. This result is opposes our hypothesis. The 
distraction we used rnay have produced slight physiological arousal in subjects 
causing thern to attribute this arousal to affective sources. This interpretation 
would explain our results and is consistent with previous research on the affective 
consequences of arousal (Schachter & Singer, 1962). 
1 
Introduction 
Self-awareness theory bcca111c a distinct body of thought with the publication 
of A Theory of Objective Self-Atvareness (Wicklund & Duval, 1972). In this initial 
theory, awareness was divided into subjective and objective self-awareness. 
Objective self-awareness referred to attention focused inward toward the self; 
subjective self-awareness referred to attention focused out\vard toward the 
environ1nent. One of the 111ajor effects of self-awareness is its effect on e1notion. 
Self-awareness, in general, tends to increase the strength of whatever e1notion is 
currently being experienced (Schcier, Carver & Gibbons, 1979). For exa1nple, 
self-focused attention has been shown to increase responsiveness to fearful affect 
(Scheier, Carver & Gibbons, 1981). 
This capacity of self-awareness to increase responsiveness to en1otion served 
as a basis for a self-awareness theory of depression (Pyszczynski (\: Greenberg, 
1987). The goal of this paper is to e111pirically explore son1e of the predictions of 
the self-awareness theory of depression. Before doing so, a theoretical overview 
of self-awareness theory as well as the self-awareness theory of depression vvill be 
presented. 
Objective Self-Awareness 
The reflexive self was first fonnulated into a complete theory by Robert 
Wicklund and Shelley Duval in their definitive book A Theory of Objective Self-
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Awareness ( 1972). The theory atte1npted to answer so1nc of the f unda1nental 
questions i~ confonnity, social influence, and attitude change research. Self-
awareness theory is based upon the distinction between two alternative fonns of 
conscious attention. These two fonns of consciousness arc subjective self-
awareness and objective self-awareness. Subjective self-awareness n~~fers to the 
state of consciousness in which the individual's attention is focused on events 
external to his personal history, body, or consciousness. Objective self-awareness 
is the state of consciousness in which attention is focused inward, toward his 
conscious state, personal history, or body (Wicklund & Duval, 1972). Since 
Wicklund and Duval' s book was published, rnuch research has been done on the 
behavioral and affective consequences of self-awareness. In order to understand 
self-awareness theory in its present context, a detailed analysis of Wicklund and 
Duval' s theory is required. 
One of the 1nost i111portant tenets of self-awareness theory is that attention 
can only be focused in one direction at a tirne (Wicklund & Duval, 1972; 
Wicklund, 1979). An individual can either be objectively or subjectively self-
aware at any given point in ti111e, but she cannot be both. It is i1npossible for 
these states of consciousness to occur simultaneously. For exa111ple, when one is 
concentrating on building a complicated n1odel, it is irnpossible that she, at that 
instant, could also be analyzing her personal qualities. Often attention can oscillate 
between subjective and objective states fast enough that the illusion of sirnultaneous 
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attention can be produced. However, this is sin1ply an illusion; attention can only 
be focused in one direction at a tin1e. 
This mono-directional property of attention is i1nportant because there are 
funda1ncntal differences between subjective and objective self-awareness. These 
differences suggest that the two operate independently of each other in order to 
f ul fi 11 their separate functions. 
When an individual is objectively self-aware he is focusing on salient parts 
of hi1nsel f. Self-awareness theory proposes that this attentional focus is not neutral 
(Wicklund & Duval, 1972). Rather, when one is objectively self-a\vare, she is 
engaged in evaluation of salient aspects of herself. Specifically, an objective} y 
self-aware person is evaluating herself in light of standards of correctness that she 
possesses. These standards of correctness are defined as n1ental representations 
of what the individual perceives to be desirable or ideal behavior, attitudes, 
personality traits, physical appearance etc. Individuals have 1ncntal representations 
of proper table 1nanners, what hairstyles are fashionable, and \vhat kind of 
personality traits arc desirable. All these standards of correctness define what a 
person should be. 
This con1parison only occurs when a person is objectively self aware 
(Wicklund, 1979). For exa1nple, one does not evaluate whether his hair is con1bed 
unless son1ething causes him to focus on the neatness of his hair. When this 
occurs, the person engages in objective self-awareness concerning his physical 
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appearance. I-lis appearance is con1parcd to what he believes he should look like -
standard of correctness. 
Research by Carver (1975) illustrates this _point. Subjects were tested on 
their attitudes toward punish1nent as a 1neans of learning. They \Vere then asked 
to use punishment by ad1ni nistcring an electric shock in all attcn1pt to teach another 
person a task. A n1irror was used to induce objective self-awareness on subjects. 
Those that were objt~ctivcly self-aware showed n1ore consistency between their 
behavior and their previously stated attitude than did nonself-aware persons. 
Theoretically, self-aware individuals were n1orc aware of the salient standard they 
possessed concerning the use of punish1nent and applied that standard to the 
situation. In another study, subjects were asked to reproduce geo1nctrical figures 
while objectively self-aware or not self-aware (Scheicr & Carver, 1983). Self-
aware subjects referred to the drawings 1nore ofte:1 than did nonself-awarc 
subjects. This finding suggests that self-awareness causes individuals to co1npare 
perfonnance with a standard of correctness n1ore often than nonself-a\vare persons. 
Co1nparison of self with standards of correctness is assun1ed to be an 
automatic response to objective self-awareness. When one focuses attention on a 
particular aspect of herself, she will imn1ediately beco1ne aware of discrepancies 
between herself and her standards of correctness. Perhaps the 1nost significant 
element of this process is the corresponding negative affect that results. The 
discrepancy between the real and ideal self on a particular aspect of the self elicits 
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negative affect in the individual. The intensity of negative affect is detennined by 
the size of the discrepancy. 
One of the eff eels of objective self-awareness is its 1notivational 
consequences~ Self-awareness theory posits two n1otivational consequences of 
objective self-awareness. Recall that negative affect results when one bccornes 
objectively self-aware and begins to perceive discrepancies between herself ar1d her 
standard of correctness. There are two courses of action open to the individual 
experiencing this negative affect. First the person could change her behavior to 
correspond with her ideal. This however is so1neti1nes difficult. If she is focusing 
on her tone of voice when confronting an crnployee about a work related proble1n, 
she can easily change that behavior to what she perceives as the ideal way to speak 
to a poorly behaved cn1ployec. 1--lowevcr, if she discovers she is lacking in 
con1passion towards those less fortunate, she rnay not want to go through the long 
arduous process of trying to change this personality trait. In this second case she 
is likely to avoid sti1nuli that produce awareness of that personality trait, i.e. self-
focusing stirnuli. This avoidance is an effective way to escape the negative affect 
produced when she focuses on her lack of con1passion (Wicklund & Duval, 1972; 
Wicklund, 1979). 
This point is demonstrated in attitude - behavior consistency research. 
Individuals who engage in attitude discrepant behavior tend to avoid self-focused 
attention, while those who engage in attitude consistent behavior seek self-focused 
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attention (Gibbons & Wicklund, 1976; Greenberg & Mushan1, 1981). Individuals 
who engage in attitude discrepant behavior avoid self-awareness because of the 
negative affect produced by awareness of their discrepancy. Individuals who 
engage in attitude consistent behavior seek self-awareness because they do not 
perceive a discrepancy and positive affect results. 
Objective self-awareness can be elicited by any stin1ulus that requires a 
person to focus on herself. Tape recordings of one's voice, 1nirrors, video 
carneras, and audience presence are just a fe\v of the stirnuli known to elicit 
objective self-awareness (Wicklund c~ Duval, 1972; \Vicklund, 1979). In sornc 
cases, external stirnuli arc not even necessary to cause objective self-a\vareness. 
Sin1pl y concentrating on one's foot or navel is enough. The effects of this state 
of objective self-awareness on behavior are far reaching. 
Subjective self-awareness is the opposite of objective self-awareness. 
Instead of focusing attention on the self as an object, subjective self-awareness 
involves focusing attention on things external to the self. The prirnary function of 
subjective self-awareness is to allow. for affective functioning in the environrnent. 
Driving a car, playing baseball, and writing a letter are just a few exarnples of 
tasks that require attention to be focused externally. Subjective self-a\vareness is 
what enables us to concentrate on the environrnent and perfonn adaptively within 
it. 
The· self-evaluation characteristic of objective self-awareness is i1npossible 
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when an individual is subjectively self-aware. Wicklund and Duval ( 1972) use the 
exa1nplc of an English teacher who says "ain't" to her class, but fails to engage 
in self-evaluation because she is attending to the condition of her class. She will 
not con1pare her perfonnancc to a standard of correctness while subjectively self-
aware. 
Subjective self-awareness is elicited when a person is con1pcllcd to focus her 
attention on the environ111ent. For exa111ple, son1eonc who engages in 111anual 
labor, or activities that require n1otor n1ove111ent and concentration will be forced 
to direct their attention outward. The degree of this outward focus is contingent 
upon the an1ount of concentration required to con1plctc a task. Any stin1ulus in 
the environn1ent that can attract the attention of an individual is sufficient to cause 
subjective self-awareness. 
Research has shown that rnanipulations of self-awareness i1npact a wide 
range of behavioral and psychological pheno1n~na. For exarnplc, objectively self-
aware individuals de1nonstrate increased accuracy on self-reports (Gibbons, 1983). 
Subjects who were self-focused perforn1ed con1plcx 111ental arith1netic significantly 
faster than nonself-focused subjects (Zi1nring, 1985). Self-focus resulted in 
increase color naming latencies on the stroop tasks for self relevant words (Geller 
& Shaver, 1976). Intellectual performance of high test anxiety subjects was 
enhanced by self-focus (Slapion & Carver, 1981). Alcohol intoxication effects are 
felt more strongly when an individual is self-focused (Zuber, Srnari, N ystedt & 
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Bcrgrnan, 1988). 
In surnmary, the theory of self-awareness developed by Wicklund and Duval 
posits the existence of one innate consciousness with directional properties. The 
self can focus either on external events in the environn1ent or on events internal 
to the self. However, the self cannot focus on both internal and external events 
at the sarne tin1e. tle will not engage in self-evaluation in this state of 
consciousness because he is unable to attend to the self. 
Objective self-awareness is a state of consciousness in \vhich the person is 
focusing on the self as an object. This state of objective self-awareness 
autornatically causes the person to con1pare hirnself with his O\Vll 1nental 
representations of what he judges to be standards of correctness. Discrepancies 
between the actual self and the ideal self cause the individual to experience 
negative affect. When negative affect results fro1n objective self-awareness, the 
~ 
person can either change hin1self to correspond to his ideal self, or he can avoid 
stimuli that focus attention on that part of hirnself that is not ideal. This is the 
basic theory developed by Wicklund and Duval ( 1972). 
Control Theory 
Since the publication of Wicklund and Duval' s book there have been several 
alternative theories developed. The most popular of these alternative theories is 
Carver and Scheier's control theory (1981). This information processing theory 
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accepts rnost of the basic assertions of Wicklund and Duval's theory; however, 
there arc several i1nportant areas in which they differ. 
The most significant contribution of Carver and Sheier' s 1nodcl is their 
dcvelop1nent of the concept of a standard. Wicklund and Duval's 1nodcl represents 
standards as standards of correctness with which a person cornparcs hi1nselJ 
(Wicklund & Duval, 1972). These standards of "correctness" connote perfection 
or even a rnoral representation that is cornpared with behavior (Gibbons, 1990). 
Carver and Scheier sec standards as points of cornparison rather than standards of 
correctness (Gibbons, 1990; Carver and Scheier, 198 I). 
The basis for these differences lies in Carver and Scheicr's control theory 
n1odel. All of behavior and action is regulated by a cybernetic process of 
behavioral loops. All of behavior consists of action, cornparison to a reference 
point and subsequent action. Motor control is 1naintained by cornparing the results 
of a particular action to a reference point, and then reacting based on the 
con1parison. For cxa111ple, steering adjust1nents are co1npared to the driver's 
perception of the cars place on the road and subsequent adjust111ents are perfonned. 
All behavior is regulated in this 111anner within a hierarchical structure of 
con1parison points. Action, behavior, affect, and etc. are all represented in this 
hierarchy at different levels of abstraction. Each point in the hierarchy has as its 
con1parison point the superordinate point. For a fuller discussion of control theory 
refer to Carver and Scheier ( 1981). 
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The hierarchy described above docs not always en1ploy standards of 
correctness in the n1oralistic Wicklund and Duval sense. This type of co1nparison 
does occur within the control n1odel, however there are also co1nparisons that are 
si1npl y co1nparison points for correct 1notor control. Carver and Scheier expanded 
"standards" beyond the scope of Wicklund and Duval's definition in order to 
incorporate all aspects of behavior into a single cybernetic f ra1ne\Vork that includes 
the functional aspects of self-awareness. 
Another rnajor difference between Wicklund and Duval's original 1nodcl and 
Carver and Scheier's 1nodcl is the idea of expectancies. Recall Wicklund and 
Duval's basic progression; self-focus - self-evaluation - recognition of son1e 
discrepancy - negative affect - atternpted discrepancy reduction or avoidance. 
Carver and Scheier posit expectancy as the detennining factor in the choice 
between discrepancy reduction and avoidance. The individual will decide to avoid 
aversive sti111uli if his expectancy is that discrepancy reduction will be 
unsuccessful. Conversely, if an individual believes discrepancy reduction will be 
successful, he is likely to attcn1pt it. This hypothesis has received n1uch en1pirical 
support over the past few years (Carver & Blaney, 1977; Carver, Blaney & 
Scheicr, 1979). 
Control theory de111onstrates proper self-regulatory function in an individual. 
Maintenance of the self relative to standards is essential to adaptability in the social 
environment. What happens when this self-regulatory function does not work 
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properly? Self-awareness allows a person to perceive and correct discrepancies 
between hi1nself and his standards. When a person be~o1nes depressed this self-
regulation systern breaks down. 
Depressive Self-Focusing Style 
Past research on the effect of self-focus on affective phcno1nena suggests 
that self-focus is related to depression in some irnportant ways. Self-focus has 
been shown to intensify affective states, particularly negative states, (Carver & 
Scheier, 1977; Scheier, Carver & Gibbons, 1979) and it causes increased self-
evaluation (Ickes, Wicklund & Ferris, 1973). 
Greenberg and Pyszczynski ( 1986) suggested that a defect in the self-
regulatory n1echanis111 1nay be responsible for depressive affect. Norn1al non-
depressed individuals have a relatively consistent way of dealing with success and 
failure. Re1nc1nbcr the goal of the self-regulatory syste1n is 111aintenance of the 
self relative to standards. After success, non-depressed individuals show increased 
self-focus, allowing the1n to focus on positive aspects of the1nselves and rnaintain 
positive affect. After failure, non-depressed individuals engage in self-focus 
initially, but this reaction decays quickly. These results are consistent with a 
conceptualization of control theory. When a person fails, he initially focuses on 
himself to detern1ine the cause of the failure. Once this has been detennined, he 
decides on a course of action and self-focus is tern1inated. Self-focus after failure 
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produces negative affect due to discrepancies between oneself and ones standard; 
however, if this self focus is tcrn1inatcd quickly, negative affect \Viii be lin1itcd. 
In this case, self-focus is adaptive in that it allows persons to perceive 
discrepancies and currect those discrepancies while avoiding inlenst: or prolonged 
negative affect. 
Depressed subjects, on the other hand, \:Vere shown to have a different self-
focusing stylC (Greenberg(~ Pyszczynski, 1986; Pysz.czy.nski & Greenberg, 1985). 
After success, ·depressed subjects were shown .to self-focus sig_nificantly Tess than 
nondepresscd subjects. This phcnornena. docs not al lo\v depressed people to fee I 
the positive affect associated with success. After fa-ilure, depressed subjects. 
beco1nc self-focused n1.uch like their non-depressed counterparts. Ho\vever, they 
fail to stop self-focusing after sufficient tirne has passed. They continue to focus 
on the discrepancies bct\vccn their real and ideal self, thus exacerbating negative 
affect. 
Depressed _persons fail to focus on then1s~lves after success, thus reducing 
positive-affect. Additi-onally, they fail to stop focusing on then1selvcs after failure,. 
thus exacerbating negative affect. Thi·s has been tenned the depressive self-
focusing style. 
The inability to exit a defective self-regulatory loqp functions by causing a 
person to focus prirnarily on himself and the discfepancies bet\veen his real and 
ideal self. This defective .self-regulatory loop produces many different affective, 
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cognitive and behavioral -results that arc often associated with depression 
(Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1989). For exa1nple, Greenberg and Pyszctynski 
(1986) state that the defective self-regulatory loop produces: 
(a) an increase in the amount of negative affect ·and a decrease in the 
a1nount of positive affect the person experiences; (b) an increase in the· 
arnount of sclf-criticisrn and a decrease in the a1nount of self-praise that 
occurs; (c) an increase in the tendency to n1ake dispositional attributions for 
failure and situational attributions for success; and (d) an exaggeration of 
one's pessirnisrn and low n1otivation after failure and a 1nini1nization of 
one's opti1nisn1 and 1notivation after success (pg. 1039) 
Depression can thus be characterized as an inability to exit a defective self-
regulatory loop (Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987). 
The proposed n1echanisn1 for this defective self-regulatory loop is the 
pri1ning effect of self-focus on the negative self-schen1a (Pyszczynski & 
Greenberg, 1989). This prirning effect increases the influence of the negative self-
schema on various cognitive, affective, and behavioral responses. Depressed 
people start with a 1nuch rnore negative self-sche1na (Beck, 1967; Kuiper, 
MacDonald & Derry, 1983). This n1ore negative self-scherna con1bined with 
increased self-focus influences cognition, men1ory, and thoughts by increasing their 
negativity. 
If the influence of the negative self-schema is increased by self-focus, then 
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distraction from the negative self-schema should decrease its effect on cognition, 
behavior and affect. Further, we would expect that the effects of the def ectivc 
self-regulatory loop should be offset when attention is shifted away fro1n the 
negative self-schen1a. Consistent with this hypothesis, distraction f ron1 the 
negative self-sche1na has been shown to decrease its influence on pessi1nisrn for 
future life events (Pyszczynski, Holt & Greenberg, 1987). Depressed subjects are 
1nore pessi1nistic concerning their own futures. However, this oessin1isrn can be 
. . 
off set by distracting subjects frorn their negative self-sche1nas. Prcsurnabl y, the 
pessin1isrn exhibited by subjects originally, is due to the influence of the negative 
self-scherna on thoughts about the future. The effect of distraction on expectations 
for future life events shows that the depressive self-regulatory loop can be exited 
by focusing attention on things external to the self (Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 
1989). 
Additional evidence for the positive effect of distraction fro1n the negative 
self-schen1a on depression was provided by Pyszczynski and Greenberg ( 1989) in 
their work on the negative 1ne1nory bias. The negative n1en1ory bias is defined as 
an increased tendency for depressed people to retrieve n1e1nories that are negative. 
This effect appears for 1nemories of actual life events, (Clark & Teasdale, 1982; 
Diener, Larsen & E1nmons, 1984) for affectively toned 1naterial, (Finkel, Glass 
& Merluzzi, 1982) and for positive and negative feedback given on particular tasks 
(DeMonbreun & Craighead, 1977; Pyszczynski, Hamilton, Herring & Greenberg, 
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1989). Additionally, depressed persons take longer to retrieve positive 1ne1nories 
than negative n1e1nories (Lloyd & Lish1nan, 1975). These results have been 
explained in tenns of an increased accessibility to mood congruent 1ne1nories 
(Teasdale & Russell, 1983; Payne, 1990). Depressed persons are 1nore likely to 
retricv~ negative n1cn1ories because negative n1e1nories are 1nost consistent with 
their chronic 1nood state. 
Pyszczynski and Greenberg (1989) hypothesized that this negative mc1nory 
bias was at least partially due to increased attention to the negative self-schen1a. 
They conducted a study that asked both nondepressed and depressed subjects to 
retrieve two week old 1nc1nories about themselves while self-focused or externally 
f ocuscd. Results showed that depressed subjects retrieved significantly n1ore 
negative mc1nories when self-focused than when externally focused. Non-
depressed individuals showed no significant difference in the nun1ber of negative 
n1e1nories rct~ietcd while self-focused or externally focused. These results suggest 
• 
that focusing on the self increases the influence of the negative self-schen1a on 
1ne1nory retrieval, while focusing externally decreases the influence of the negative 
self-sche1na on 1ne1nory retrieval. 
Statement of the Problen1 
The self-awareness theory of depression suggests that the influence of self-
focus occurs partly through activation of the negative self-schen1a. Self-schemas 
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arc core central aspects of the self that guide the processing of inf onnation within 
the individual. Part of the explanation for depression is that a depressed person 
possesses a distinctly negative self-scherna (Kuiper, Derry & MacDonald, 1982). 
This negative self-scherna exerts its rnost powerful effect on infonnation that is 
scl f-relevant (Markus, 1983). For exarnple, Pyszczynski and G reenbcrg ( 1989) 
showed that when depressed people retrieve rnernories that are sci f-relevant, they 
rate those 1nernorics n1ore negatively than rnemories that involve other people. 
The activated negative sclf-scherna guides retrieval of inforn1ation producing a 
negative rncrnory bias. 
Pyszczynski and Greenberg ( 1989) showed that the negative men1ory bias 
in depressed people is exacerbated when they arc forced to focus on then1selves. 
Focusing attention on the self activates the depressed person's negative self-schema 
allowing it to influence subsequent processing of infonnation. Conversely, when 
a person's attentional focus is directed externally, away fro1n the negative self-
sche1na, the negative n1e1nory bias is reduced (Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1989). 
Long tenn autobiographical 111cn1ories tend to be self-defining and irnportant 
n1cn1ories to the individual (Singer, Saltzberg & Yatin1, 1989). If these memories 
are n1ore important to the individual and they are rnore self-defining, then they are 
also more important in the formation of the self-schema. Further, they are also 
more likely to be influenced by the activation or deactivation of the self-schema. 
However, empirical research has examined only the effects of self-awareness on 
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the retrieval of short tenn . n1emones in depressives and nondepressives 
(Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1989). 
The first goal of this study is to den1onstrate the self-awareness theory of 
depression using autobiographical n1e1nories. The self-awareness theory of 
depression states that self-focus will cause depressed subjects to retrieve 1nore 
negative autobiographical n1ernories, and rate those negative 111cn1orics as more 
self-defining. Conversely, external focus will distract depressed persons frorn their 
negative sclf-scherna and allow for the recall of n1ore positive rncn1ories. This is 
a replication of Pyszczynski and Greenberg ( 1989) except we will be using long 
tenn autobiographical rnernories instead of short term n1emories as our dependent 
variable. 
In addition, the second goal of this study is to distinguish between two 
alternative explanations of the effect of self-awareness on depression. The first is 
the explanation that has been assu1ned throughout this discussion. It is called the 
attentional focus rnodel. This 1nodel assun1es that increases in ratings of affective 
intensity are due to the increased attention of individuals to their internal states 
(Hansen, Hansen & Crano, 1989). In the case of depressed people, self-focus 
increases awareness of the negative self-schen1a. Focus on and sensitivity to the 
negative self-schema brought about by self-focus is what causes increased ratings 
of negative affect. This attentional focus model is consistent with explanations of 
the idea that self-focus increases the consistency of self-report and behavior 
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(Gibbons, 1983). Self-focus also increases awareness of bodily states (Scheier, 
Carver & Gibbons, 1979; Zuber, S1nari & N·ystedt, 1988). These phenornena arc 
explained by an increased awareness of internal states as a result of self-focus. 
The alternative explanation asserts that directing attention towards an 
affective reaction actually increases the intensity of affective arousal (Schcicr, 
Carver & Matthews, 1982; Buss, 1980; Gibbons, 1990). This 1nodcl is different 
fro1n the attentional focus 1nodel in that the internal affective state itself is changed 
by sci f-focus. In fact research has shown that sci f-focus increases ratings of 
affective i ntcnsity for both posi ti vc affect and depression (Schei er & Carver, 
1977). Additionally, self-focus increases aggressive behavior in angry individuals 
(Schcier, 1976; Carver, 1975). However, no study has yet definitively separated 
the effects of attention fron1 the effects of affective arousal. The current study will 
atten1pt a preli1ninary test to differentiate between the two n1odels. 
This will be accornplished by rnanipulating attentional focus, and asking 
subjects to retrieve autobiographical n1e1nories. Some of the subjects will receive 
a distracting stimuli after the attentional focus n1anipulation and before the me1nory 
retrieval. The arousal model in this case would predict preservation of the 
negative rne1nory bias for self-focused depressed subjects because the increased 
affective arousal would not have ti1ne to dissipate. The attentional focus n1odel 
predicts a loss of the negative 1ne1nory bias because subjects would be distracted 
fron1 their negative self-schema. 
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In surn, the goal of the study is twofold: first, to evaluate the influence of 
attentional focus on rncrnory retrieval in depressives, and second to atten1pt to 
cornpare the attentional focus versus the affective intensity rnodels of self-
awareness. 
We have five general hypotheses. On the basis of the coos is tent 1nen1ory 
bias found in previous research, we expect that depressed subjects will retrieve 
1nore negative rnernories than nondepressed subjects (Clark & Teasdale, 1982; 
Diener, Larsen & En11nons, 1984; Payne, 1990; Lloyd & Lishn1an, 1975; 
Teasdale & Russell, 1983; Finkel, Glass & Merluzzi, 1982). Secondly, we expect 
that we will replicate Pyszczynski and Greenberg's (1989) study, which showed 
that self-focus causes an exacerbation of the negative rnernory bias in depressed 
subjects. Thirdly, we expect depressed self-focused subjects to focus on their 
negative self-schen1as rnore than any other group, resulting in increased ratings on 
self-definingness when negative n1en1ories are considered (Pyszczynski, Holt & 
Greenberg, 1987; Singer, Saltzberg & Yati1n, 1989). Fourthly, we also expect 
that increased awareness of internal states caused by self-focus will produce higher 
ratings of clarity for self-focused subjects (Zirnring & Katz, 1988; Gibbons, 1983). 
Finally, consistent with the attentional focus 1nodel, we predict that the distraction 
task will offset the effects of the self-focus manipulation on all dependent 
measures. 
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Method 
Overview. 
A 2 x 2 x 2 factorial design was used in this study. The first factor was 
depression with two levels; depressed and nondepressed. The second factor was 
attentional focus with two levels; self-focus and external focus. The last factor 
was distraction with two levels; distracted and nondistracted. Subjects were 
rando1nly assigned to cells within their depression condition. 
Insert Table I here 
Pretesting. 
Subjects were pre-screened for depression using the Beck Depression 
Inventory (BDI) (Beck, 1967). Three hundred undergraduates fro1n an 
introductory psychology course were given the BDI in class to take ho1ne and 
con1plete for class credit. Two hundred and thirty three subjects returned the 
con1pleted inventories. The Beck Depression Inventory is a twenty-one iten1 
questionnaire that reliably measures levels of depression frorn nondepressed to 
clinically depressed. Standard BDI cutoffs of 9 and above for depressed subjects 
and 4 and below for nondepressed subjects were used to classify subjects (Alloy 
& Abramson, 1982; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1989). This procedure left I 05 
subjects for use in the second part of the study. 
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Subjects. 
Subjects were I 05 undergraduates between the ages of 18 and 20 frorn 
Lehigh University who were selected on the basis of their BDI scores. There were 
54 subjects in the nondepressed condition; 25 fen1ales and 29 111alcs, and 51 
subjects in the depressed condition, 28 fernales and 23 1nalcs. Within each 
condition subjects were randornly assigned to the distraction condition and the 
attentional focus condition. 
Materials and Procedure. 
Approximately two weeks after co111pleting the BD I, the subjects selected 
participated in the second part of the study. Subjects participated in the study in 
groups of one to eight. Each person \Vas given an infonned consent fonn to 
con1plete which explained that the general purpose of the study \Vas to explore the 
relationship of personality to rnernory retrieval. Subjects were then given the 
con1plete packet of test rnaterials in written fonn. The packet included the 
attentional focus rnanipulation, an autobiographical men1ory task, and in the 
distraction condition, a distracting task. 
Subjects began by cornpleting a self-focus writing task or an external focus 
writing task developed by Fenigstein and Levine ( 1984). In this task they were 
given a list of twenty words and asked to write a short story using as n1any of the 
words as possible. In the self-focus condition, subjects were asked to write a story 
about themselves using words like I, my, alone, and n1e. In the external focus 
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condition subjects were asked to write a story about George Washington using 
words like him, he, and together. This n1ethod has been shown to be an effective 
n1anipulation of attentional focus (Fenigstein & Levine, 1984; Greenberg et al, 
1988; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987; Pyszczynski, Ha1nilton, Herring & 
Greenberg, 1989). 
In the distraction condition, subjects found a distraction task i1nmediately 
following the attentional focus manipulation. This distraction task asked then1 to 
fill eight spaces with nu1nbcrs generated by counting backwards by sevens frorn 
five hundred. Those in the nondistraction condition did not receive the distraction 
task. 
The last part of the test packet was the autobiographical 1nen1ory task. This 
task asked subjects to retrieve fron1 memory ten speci fie events in which they were 
directly involved, and that were more than one year old (Hyland & Ackennan, 
1988). Each of these n1en1ories was stunrnarized in one or two sentences. 
After all ten n1en1ories were retrieved, subjects were asked to rate their 
n1en1ories on five likert scales. These n1e1nory ratings were the dependent 
variables in this study. The first was a bipolar scale that evaluated the positivity 
or negativity of the n1emory. The endpoints of the scale were -5 and 5. The 
labels were negative for -5, neutral for 0, and positive for 5. Subjects were then 
asked to rate the clarity of their me1nories, and the self-definingness of their 
memories on nine point Likert scales. These scales ranged from 1 to 9 with one 
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least extre1ne and nine 1nost extren1e. 
Self-definingness was evaluated using three different questions. The three 
questions were: "If someone had observed this event, how much would they learn 
about you as a person;" "Is this 1ne1nory important in terms of your conception of 
yourscl f;" and II would you be different if this event had not happened to you?" 
When subjects con1plcted this task they were given a debriefing fonn and allowed 
to leave. 
24 
Results 
To evaluate the cff ccts of the 111anipulations on the dependent 1neasures a 
2 x 2 x 2, depression x attentional focus x distraction, an ANOV A was perfonned 
for each of the dependent variables. Additionally, at-test was perfonned between 
the depressed and the nondcprcsscd groups on their affective ratings of 1ne1nories. 
Affective Quality of Mernories 
W_e hypothesized that depressed subjects would retrieve 1nore negative 
.mernorics than nondcprcsscd subjects. This hypothesis was supported by a 
significant one-tailed t statistic for depression, !(103) == 1.7381, p < .05, Mtkpr == 
.4458, MnonJepr == . 9448, with depressed subjects recalling 1nore negative 1ne1nories 
than nondepressed subjects. There was also a 1narginally significant n1ain effect 
for distraction condition, F(I ,97) == 2.809, p== .097, Muist == .4543, MnonJist = 
. 9363, with distracted subjects recalling 1nore negative 1ne1nories than 
nondistracted subjects. 
Most in1portantly there was a close to significant depression x attentional 
focus x distraction interaction, F(l ,97) == 3.470, p< .0655. 
Insert Figure 1 here 
Figure 1 shows that contrary to our hypothesis, we did not replicate Pyszczynski 
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and Greenberg ( 1989) within the nondistractcd condition. That is there was no 
interaction of self-focus and depression such that depressed self-focused subjects 
retrieved n1ore negative n1en1ories. However, the pattern of results within the 
distracted condition is consistent with Pyszczynski and Greenberg, with n1cn1ories 
within the depressed, self-focused condition rated as n1ore negative. 
The significant threcway inferaction s·hows that depressed, self-focused and 
distracted subjects retrieved n1ore negative 1ne1nories than did nondcpressed, 
nondistracted, externally focused subjects, p < .05. Pairwise contrasts within the 
depressed self-focused condition, showed that distraction had a significant effect 
on the affective quality of 1ne1nories, F(l ,97) == 3.989, p== .0486, with distraction 
causing n1ore negative n1en1ories to be retrieved. A contrast within the depressed 
condition between self-focused, distracted subjects and the other three groups of 
depressed subjects was rnarginally significant, F(l,97) == 3.083, p==.0823. 
Additionally, a contrast within the nondepressed condition between the externally-
focused, nondistracted subjects and the other groups of nondeprcssed subjects 
showed a trend toward significance, F( 1 , 97) - 2. 85, p ==. 14. 
Self-definingness of Mernories 
A 2 (depression) x 2 (attentional focus) x 2 (distraction) ANOV A was 
performed on each of the three n1easures of self-definingness yielding no 
significant results. Table three shows that the correlations between the three 
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measures of self-definingness were all significant. 
-------------------------------------
Insert Table 3 here 
-------------------------------------
Subsequent analysis was perfonned on an index of self-definition created by 
co1nputing a mean for all three self-definingness ratings. An overall F test was 
nonsignificant for the n1ean self-definition score. 
We hypothesized that depressed self-focused subjects would obtain a more 
negative correlation between their ratings of affect and sclf-definingncss. This 
negative correlation reflects a tendency to rate negative 1ne1nories as rnore self-
defining than positive 1nen1ories. In order to evaluate this hypothesis, correlations 
were con1puted for each subject between their affective ratings and their index of 
self-defini ngness. An r to z transf onnation was used on the correlations and the 
z scores were analyzed as one of the dependent variables. Negative z scores 
reflect a negative correlation between the affective quality and the self-definingness 
of rnen1ories. This suggests that subjects who receive a negative r between affect 
and self-definingness are rnore likely to rate negative 111emories as n1ore self-
defining than positive 1nemories. The opposite is true for positive r scores. 
An ANOV A was perfonned on the z scores. Results showed that our 
hypothesis was correct within the distraction condition. As shown in Figure 2, 
Self-focused, depressed subjects in the distraction condition did rate their negative 
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1ne1nories as ·more self-defi'ning. However, this effect did not occur within the 
nondistracted condit_ion. These results are reflected in the significant threeway 
interaction, F(l,97) == 5.677, p<.02. 
Insert Figure 2 here 
Planned pairwise con1parisons show significant differences between nondepressed, 
externally focused, non-distracted subjects and depressed, self-focused, distracted 
subjects, F(l ,97) == 6.430, p < .01, with depressed, self-focused, distracted subject 
obtaining more negative correlations. The effect of distraction on the results exists 
1nost significantly within the depressed self-focused condition, F(l,97) == 7.066, 
p < . 0 I , and in the nondepressed externally focused condition, F( I , 97) == 3. 841, 
p <. 05, with distraction causing 1nore negative correlations in both cases. This 
effect did not appear for any of the other cells. Self-focus had a significant effect 
within the depressed non-distracted condition, F(l, 97) == 3. 941, p <. 05, with 
external focus having a n1ore negative correlation. This pattern of results is 
sin1ilar to the results for affect, with the interaction of all three factors producing 
an effect. In this case the co1nbination of self-focused, depressed, and distracted, 
produces a negative correlation, suggesting negative memories were rated as 1nore 
self defining for subjects in this condition. 
Additionally, the results show a 1nain effect for distraction, F( 1, 97) 
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4.626, p<.05, Moist == -.0170, M 00noist == .1764. This suggests that distracted 
people rate negative n1e1norics as 1nore self-defining, and positive 1ne1nories as less 
self-defining. The opposite is true for the nondistracted group. 
Clarity of Memories 
We also hypothesized that self-focus would cause subjects to rate 1nernories 
as n1ore clear. Results showed that self-focus did not affect s!.lbjects ratings of 
clarity. 
However, a n1ain effect for distraction was found, F( I, 97) == 5. 841, 
p < .02, Moist == 6.730, Mnondist == 7.1575, with nondistracted subject's rating their 
n1er11orics as more clear than distracted subjects. The rneans in Table Two show 
a significant interaction between depression and distraction condition, F( 1,97) 
3.85, p < .05. 
-------------------------------------
Insert Table 2 here 
A pairwise co1nparison between depressed, distracted subjects and depressed, 
nondistracted subjects showed that distraction exerted its effects within the 
depressed condition F(l ,97) == 9.282, p < .003 Mdist,depr == 6.619, Mnouctist,ctcrr 
7 .394. This effect did not appear in the nondepressed condition. 
In order to determine if depression influenced the relationship between the 
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affective quality of a n1e111ory and its clarity, correlations were co1nputcd between 
the aff cctive ratings and clarity ratings for each subject. As in the· analysis for 
self-definingness, we thought that depressed people may rate negative 1nen1ories 
as 1nore clear because of the activation of the negative sel f-schen1a. An r to z 
transforn1ation was pcrfonned on each corr~lation coefficient and the z scores were 
anal yzcd using an ANOV A. There were _no significant n1ain effects or interactions 
for this data. This result suggests that depression, attent:onal focus, and 
distraction condition have no effect the relationship between the affective quality 
of a n1e1nory and its clarity. 
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Discussion 
The current study ·hypothesized that depressed subjects would retrieve 1nore 
negative me1nories, and rate those negative ·n1emories as 1nore self-defining than 
nondepressed subjects. Additionally, we expected depression and attentional focus 
to interact to produce an exacerbation of this negative 1ne1nory bias in depressed 
self-focused subjects, and a decrease in the negative n1e1nory bias for depressed 
subjects in the external focus group. Self-focus was expected te> produce clearer 
n1en1ories for subjects in all conditions. Finally, we expected distraction to 
counteract the effects of attentional-focus in all conditions. Results, in general, 
support our hypothesis. However, our distraction task did not counteract the 
effects of self-focus; instead, it produced an increase in the negative n1en1ory bias 
for depressed subjects. 
We expected depression to produce n1ore negative 1nen1ories for subjects 
across conditions. Consistent with our hypothesis, the effect for depression was 
significant with depressed subjects retrieving 1nore negative 1ne1nories. 
W c also expected an interaction between depression and attentional focus 
such that depressed self-focused people would retrieve 1nore negative 1ne1nories, 
while depressed externally focused subjects would retrieve rnore positive 
mernories. This part of our study was a simple replication of the Pyszczynski and 
Greenberg ( 1989). We failed to replicate these results within our nondistracted 
condition. This failure to replicate may be due to a prin1ing effect on the negative 
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self-scherna in depressives produced by the BDI. The BDI was given to subjects 
in11ncdiately before the attentional focus rnanipulation in the Pyszczynski and 
Greenberg (1989) study suggesting that the BDI primed negative self-schen1a in 
depressed subjects producing their results. In this study subjects were given the 
BDI several weeks before the second part of the experirnent was performed, 
affectively guarding against a prirning effect. 
Thirdly, we hypothesized that depressed subjects would rate negative 
me111ories as 1nore self-defining than nondepressed subjects. This hypothesis was 
based on the assun1ption that depressed subjects possess a more negative self-
sche1na and consider 1nen1ories affectively consistent with that schen1a n1ore self-
defining. The results did not dernonstrate a significant effect for depression. 
However, significant results for distraction did occur. Distracted subjects rated 
negative rnernories as rnore self-defining, and positive 111e1nories as less self-
defining than did nondistracted subjects. Depressed self-focused subjects were 
particularly susceptible to distraction, producing negative correlations between 
affect and self-definition. This suggests that not only does distraction produce 
more negative 1ne1nories for depressed subjects, it also produces rnore negative 
self-attributions concerning those memories. 
Our fourth hypothesis asserted that self-focused subjects would retrieve 
memories that were more clear than externally focused subjects. This result was 
not significant, suggesting that self-focus does not affect the clarity of 1nemories. 
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Our final hypothesis predicted the distraction task would offset the effects 
of attentional focus on 1nemory retrieval. Instead, distraction functioned to 
enhance the effects of attentional focus. Specifically, we expected the distraction 
task to decrease the effects of self-focus on depressed subject's n1e1nory retrieval. 
The attentional focus rnodel of qepression states that attention directed toward the 
self increases awareness qf the negative self-sche1na. If our distraction task was 
effective, it should have counteracted the effects of self-focus on 1nen1ory retrieval 
by distracting attention fro1n the negative self-scherna. This, however, was not the 
case. Distraction increased the negativity of 1nernories retrieved for depressed 
self-focused subjects. Additionally, the n1ain effect for distraction was 1narginally 
significant with distracted subjects retrieving 1nore negative n1en1ories than 
nondistractcd subjects. 
One explanation of this phenornena is that the distraction caused subjects to 
focus their attention internally instead of actually distracting the1n. However, 
when clarity of 1ne1nories is exan1ined, the distracting task seen1s to have genuinely 
distracted subjects fron1 focusing on then1selves. Results showed distraction 
caused subjects to recall 1ne111ories less clearly than nondistracted subjects, which 
is exactly what we would expect for a distracted condition. A significant 
interaction was also found for distraction x depression, yielding significant effects 
for distraction within the depressed group, but not within the nondepressed group. 
Depressed people have a tendency to be more self-focused than nondepressed 
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people to begin with (Sn1ith, lngra111 & Roth, 1985). The distraction of depressed 
people 1nay have caused the significant drop in the clarity of their 1ne111ories. 
Another explanation for these results is that the distraction task we 
employed 1nay have increased_ the arousal of subjects in aff conditions. Ren1en1ber 
that our distraction task c1nployed a mental arithmetic proble1n which involved 
counting backwards by sevens fro1n five hundred. Past research shows that n1ental 
arith1nctic actually physiologically arouses people (Payne, 1982; Carrol, Turner 
& He Ila well, 1987). Schachter and Singer ( 1962) argue that when a person 
experiences arousal, an understanding of the en1otional nature of that arousal is 
active I y sought. It is possible that our subjects were aroused by the distraction 
task and interpreted that arousal as greater e1notional intensity associated with their 
. 
n1en1or1es. 
Note that the explanation we have given for the results in this study 
concerning the arousing effects of the distraction task are somewhat speculative. 
We did not take any direct physiological measures of arousal so we cannot say 
with certainty that the distraction task acted by arousing subjects. 
Further research will exa111ine the effects of ambiguous arousal on affective 
attributions made by depressed people. Results for this study were son1ewhat 
unclear and difficult to interpret due to the unanticipated findings. The hypothesis 
that ambiguous arousal is interpreted as negative and self-relevant by depressed 
subjects is worth examination. 
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ln sum, Pyszczynski and Greenberg ( 1987) developed a 1nodel of the 
depressive self-focusing style. This model was characterized by a sclf-.regulatory 
loop in which depression caused self-focus which caused exacerbated negative 
affect which caused self-focus etc. lf the arousal model is the best interpretation 
of the effects of distraction on our results, an additional co1nponent of this 
depressive self-regulatory loop n1ay be that arousal is interpreted as negative and 
self-defining. When depressed people experience arousal that i~ a111biguous, they 
will tend to interpret it as negative self-referenced arousal. 
interpretation is facilitated by self-focus. 
This neoative b 
Depressed subjects displayed a unique susceptibility to this postulated 
arousal pheno1nena. The correlational data show that depressed people who are 
self-focused tend to rate their negative n1ernories as rnore self-defining. Perhaps 
depressed people, and cspeciaJly people who are not distracted fro111 their negative 
self-scherna in any way, tend to interpret arousal as negative and negative affect 
as self-defining. 
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Table 1 
Depressed Non Depressed 
Distraction Nondistraction Distraction Nondistraction 
Self-Focus n=13 n=15 n=14 n=14 
External-Focus n=11 n=12 n=12 n=14 
N=105 
Table 1 Cell n's and design for the study 
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Table 2 
Mean Clarity Ratings. 
Condition Depressed Nondepressed 
Self-Focus 
Distraction 6.838 6.707 
Nondistraction 7.520 6.$00 
External-Focus 
Distraction 6.400 6.975 
Nondistraction 7.267 7.043 
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Table 3 
Correlation Table 
Affect 
Clarity 0.221 
Self-Defining 1 
Self-Defining 2 
Seff-Deflnfng 3 
0.187 
0.122 
0.227 
Clarity 
0.280 
0.166 
0.107 
Self-Defining 1 
0.743 
0.475 
Self-Defining 2 
0.683 
Table 3 Correlations between all dependent variables. 
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Appendix A 
Material used in experiment 
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INSTRUCTIONS 
In this study there are several tasks for you to 
complete. Please be as honest as you can and do not rush. 
Complete each page before going on to the next one or before 
looking at the next one. Do not look over the entire packet 
before beginning, rather take it one page at a time. When you 
have read and understand these instructions open the first 
page of your booklet and begin. 
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STRUCTURED WRITING ASSESSMENT 
This task was developed to assess your use of various types of words and sentence structures. In this way your writing style can be determined. Your task is simply to write a story about George Washington, true or fictional. The story should describe an event involving Washington, its antecedents and outcomes, and Washington's thoughts and feelings concerning the event. Below is a list of twenty words. Try to incorporate as many of these words as you can into your story. Just write as you naturally do, as if you were telling someone a story in a letter. There is space for story below the words and on the following pages. You'll have about ten minutes. 
Afternoon 
Think 
Rough 
Save 
Him 
He 
Together 
Picture 
Walk 
Child 
Note: External focus condition 
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Part 
Try 
Like 
Voice 
Past 
Appearance 
Identity 
Crowd 
Himself 
Reflection 
STRUCTURED WRITING ASSESSMENT 
The task was developed to assess your use of various types of 
words and sentence structures. In this way your writing style 
can be determined. Your task is simply to write a story about 
yourself which describes an event, its antecedents and 
outcomes, and the thoughts and feelings of persons taking part 
in the event. Below is a list of twenty word. Try to 
incorporate as many of these words as you can into your story. 
Just write as you naturally do, as if you were telling someone 
a story in a letter. There is space for your story below the 
words and on the following page. You' 11 have about ten 
minutes. 
Afternoon I Park Appearance 
Think Mirror Try Identity 
Rough Alone Like Crowd 
Save Walk Voice Myself 
Me Child Past Reflection 
Note: Self-focus condition 
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At this time we would like you to remember ten events. 
These events can be anything that comes to mind as long as 
they are specific events, that means you remember the specific 
time and place. For example, remembering going to camp is not 
specific, however recalling the drive to camp is specific. Additionally the events must have involved you directly and 
they must have occurred at least one year ago. For each event 
take a moment and try to recall as many details as you can. When you are finished thinking about this event, write one or 
two sentences describing the event. When you are finished 
with all ten memories go on to the next section. 
1 . 
2 . 
3 . 
4 . 
5. 
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6. 
7 • 
8 • 
9 • 
10. 
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For each of the ten memories you retrieved we would like you 
to rate each of them o~e following scales. Please be as 
honest as you can and fe 1 free to refer back to the sentences 
you wrote about your m mories. Please circle the number that 
best characterizes you. 
Memory 1 
Please rate your memory on the following scal~s 
How Positive/Negative was this memory? 
-5 -4 -3 
Negative 
-2 -1 0 
Neutral 
+1 +2 +3 +4 
Positive 
+5 
How clearly do remember the details of this memory? 
1 2 3 4 
Unclearly 
5 6 7 8 
Clearly 
9 
If someone had observed this event, how much would they· learn 
about you as a person? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Very little A lot 
Is this important . terms of conception of memory in your 
yourself? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at all Very important 
Would you be different if this event had not happened to you? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not really Very different 
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